In a recent paper, Keith Yandetl introduces an argument which seems to make short work of the problem of evil .1 Unfortunately, this line of argument is radically unsatisfactory, and the problem which the existence of evil poses for theism whatever that problem is -cannot be disposed of in that ready way.
Yandell begins by calling attention to the following proposition:
(N) Necessarily, if God allows any evil, then He has morally sufficient reason for doing so.
And he goes on to say that if (N) is true then any particular evil has the following property:
(P) If God exists, then He has morally sufficient reason for allowing this evil.
Yandell then asserts the crucial thesis of his argument. He says that "it seems clear that any evil that has P is not an evil whose existence provides evidence against God's existence. An evil that has P is useless for the critic's purposes ... If (N) is true, then every evil, and all evil together, is critically cancelled. ''2
Now, it is true that if (N) is true then (P) is true of every actual evil (but it need not be true of every possible, or prospective, evil). This is so because, if God exists, then every actual evil is an evil which is allowed by God (whom Yandell assumes to be "omnicompetent"). But, according to (N), God allows no evil without a morally sufficient reason. Hence, if (N) is true then (P) is true of every actual evil. And no doubt Yandell intended (P) to be construed as applying to actual evils, and not to merely possible evils. So far, so good.
But how does that show that if (N) is true then every actual evil is "critically cancelled"?
Yandell provides no argument whatsoever for this claim. He says merely that "it seems clear." In fact, however, it is not at all clear. But we may hazard a conjecture about how it might come to "seem" clear. What is true is that an evil which