IRC Section 162(m) and the law of unintended consequences

✍ Scribed by Kenneth R. Ferris; James S. Wallace

• Book ID: 104000277
• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 2009
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 408 KB
• Volume: 25
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0882-6110
• DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2009.06.004

✦ Synopsis

Section 162(m) Employee stock option Unintended consequence Executive compensation Dividend yield Share price volatility

In 1993, Section 162(m) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code was passed into law with the intent to reign in outsized executive compensation by eliminating the tax-deductibility of executive compensation above $1 million unless the excess compensation was performance-based. An unintended consequence of the legislation was that executives' total compensation actually increased in the post-1993 period, largely due to a dramatic increase in employee stock options. Employee stock options have unintended consequences of their own. The economic value of stock options may be influenced by executive decision-making when the options are valued using the Black-Scholes model or some variant thereof. Our findings suggests an unintended consequence that executives used their discretion to positively impact the performance-based component of their compensation through actions increasing share price volatility and reducing dividend yields, assumptions implicit in option valuation models.