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Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study

✍ Scribed by Werner Güth; Eric van Damme

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1998
Tongue
English
Weight
304 KB
Volume
42
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-2496

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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