✦ LIBER ✦

Influence & incorporation: John Forbes Nash and the “Nash Equilibrium”

✍ Scribed by Katherine W. Mccain; Roger A. Mccain

Publisher: Wiley (John Wiley & Sons)
Year: 2010
Tongue: English
Weight: 379 KB
Volume: 47
Category: Article
ISSN: 0044-7870
DOI: 10.1002/meet.14504701311

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Eponymy and Obliteration by Incorporatio

Eponymy and Obliteration by Incorporation: The case of the “Nash Equilibrium”

✍ Katherine W. McCain 📂 Article 📅 2011 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 778 KB

Equilibrium properties of the nash and s

Equilibrium properties of the nash and stackelberg strategies

✍ M. Simaan 📂 Article 📅 1977 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 153 KB

Time-dependent quasi-variational inequal

Time-dependent quasi-variational inequalities and the Nash equilibrium

✍ Bui An Ton 📂 Article 📅 2000 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 168 KB

Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stabil

Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability in Large- and finite-population “playing the field” models

✍ Vincent P. Crawford 📂 Article 📅 1990 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 882 KB

This paper studies the correspondence between Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability in large- and finite-population "playing the field" models. Whenever the fitness function is sufficiently continuous, any large-population ESS corresponds to a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game that descri

The maximum Theorem and the existence of

The maximum Theorem and the existence of Nash equilibrium of (generalized) games without lower semicontinuities

✍ Guoqiang Tian; Jianxin Zhou 📂 Article 📅 1992 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 632 KB

Impact of generators' behaviors on Nash

Impact of generators' behaviors on Nash equilibrium considering transmission constraints

✍ A. Badri; S. Jadid; M. P. Moghaddam; M. Rashidinejad 📂 Article 📅 2009 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 294 KB

## Abstract In imperfect competition, electricity markets with transmission constraints and limited number of producers, generation companies (GenCos) are facing an oligopolistic market rather than perfect competition. In this market each GenCo may increase its own payoff through strategic bidding.