Impact of generators' behaviors on Nash equilibrium considering transmission constraints
✍ Scribed by A. Badri; S. Jadid; M. P. Moghaddam; M. Rashidinejad
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 294 KB
- Volume
- 19
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1430-144X
- DOI
- 10.1002/etep.254
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✦ Synopsis
Abstract
In imperfect competition, electricity markets with transmission constraints and limited number of producers, generation companies (GenCos) are facing an oligopolistic market rather than perfect competition. In this market each GenCo may increase its own payoff through strategic bidding. This paper investigates the problem of developing optimal bidding strategies of GenCos considering participants' market power as well as transmission constraints. The problem is modeled as a bi‐level optimization that at the first level each GenCo maximizes its payoff through strategic bidding, while at the second level, an independent system operator (ISO) dispatches power, solving an optimal power flow (OPF) problem. The objective of proposed optimization model is generating optimal bidding strategies for GenCos, while satisfying transmission constraints. Different aspects of exercising market power are studied and the corresponding effects on Nash equilibrium and GenCos' characteristics are proposed. Finally, the interaction of participants' different bidding strategies is investigated. An IEEE‐30 bus test system is used for case study to demonstrate simulation results. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.