In this paper we examine two effects of incumbency. First, an incumbent may have an advantage in creating a favorable image in the eyes of the voters. Second, the incumbent may have to chose a position before the challenger; this second aspect of incumbency is modelled as Stackelberg leadership. In the model two candidates run for election by choosing a position in an ideological spectrum. Voters care about candidates' chosen positions as well as non-policy attributes of candidates, which we call charisma. Charismata are not known when candidates choose policy positions; they are only revealed on election day so that winning is not usually a certain prospect. Candidates care about the probability of winning but they also dislike compromising their own ideals.
We find that the incumbent's equilibrium position is closer to his/her own ideal point than the equilibrium position of the game when moves are simultaneous. Also, for sufficiently large charismatic differences a natural leadership regime prevails: the candidate with the large charismatic advantage prefers being a leader to being a follower and the opponent prefers being a follower. If the difference in charismata is small both players prefer to be followers * This is a revised version of Thomas Jefferson Discussion Paper 199. We are grateful to participants of the Public Economics Workshop at the University of Virginia and to an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. John Chilton and Doug Mitchell have also given us exceptionally fine detailed suggestions for improvements. The usual caveat applies.