✦ LIBER ✦

INCENTIVE DESIGN UNDER LOSS AVERSION

✍ Scribed by David de Meza; David C. Webb

Book ID: 111758419
Publisher: MIT Press
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 203 KB
Volume: 5
Category: Article
ISSN: 1542-4766
DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2007.5.1.66

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Optimal incentive contracts under inequi

Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

✍ Florian Englmaier; Achim Wambach 📂 Article 📅 2010 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 288 KB

Incentives design under parametric uncer

Incentives design under parametric uncertainty

✍ Chunhui Xu; Kijima, K. 📂 Article 📅 1998 🏛 IEEE 🌐 English ⚖ 298 KB

Optimal asset allocation under linear lo

Optimal asset allocation under linear loss aversion

✍ Ines Fortin; Jaroslava Hlouskova 📂 Article 📅 2011 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 708 KB

Warranty design under buyer and seller r

Warranty design under buyer and seller risk aversion

✍ Peter H. Ritchken; Charles S. Tapiero 📂 Article 📅 1986 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 515 KB

This paper provides a framework in which warranty policies for non-repairable items can be evaluated according to risk preferences of both buyers and sellers. In particular, a warranty price schedule is established such that sellers are indifferent among the policies. Given this schedule, a buyer's

Optimal Incentive Contracts for Loss-Ave

Optimal Incentive Contracts for Loss-Averse Managers: Stock Options versus Restricted Stock Grants

✍ Anna Dodonova; Yuri Khoroshilov 📂 Article 📅 2006 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 444 KB

Neural Mechanisms Underlying Paradoxical

Neural Mechanisms Underlying Paradoxical Performance for Monetary Incentives Are Driven by Loss Aversion

✍ Vikram S. Chib; Benedetto De Martino; Shinsuke Shimojo; John P. O'Doherty 📂 Article 📅 2012 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 967 KB