Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle

✍ Scribed by John A. Weymark

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 1993
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 704 KB
• Volume: 10
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0176-1714
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00182506

✦ Synopsis

Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem is concerned with the aggregation of individual preferences defined on the set of lotteries generated from a finite set of basic prospects into a social preference. These preferences are assumed to satisfy the expected utility hypothesis and are represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Harsanyi's Theorem says that if Pareto Indifference is satisfied, then the social utility function must be an affine combination of the individual utility functions. This article considers the implications for Harsanyi's Theorem of replacing Pareto Indifference with Weak Pareto.