Further remarks on Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak Pareto principle

✍ Scribed by John A. Weymark

Publisher: Springer
Year: 1995
Tongue: English
Weight: 363 KB
Volume: 12
Category: Article
ISSN: 0176-1714
DOI: 10.1007/bf00182195

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📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem an

Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle

✍ John A. Weymark 📂 Article 📅 1993 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 704 KB

Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem is concerned with the aggregation of individual preferences defined on the set of lotteries generated from a finite set of basic prospects into a social preference. These preferences are assumed to satisfy the expected utility hypothesis and are represented by v