The article provides an evolutionary analysis of a finite!y iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The backward induction reasoning for a breakdown of cooperation in this game is transformed to an evolutionary degradation effect. After the introduction of random variations in the strategies' population size,
β¦ LIBER β¦
Gradual cooperation in the existence of outside options
β Scribed by Taiji Furusawa; Toshikazu Kawakami
- Book ID
- 116635419
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 369 KB
- Volume
- 68
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0167-2681
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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