The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory

✍ Scribed by Rudolf Schuessler

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1989
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 923 KB
• Volume: 26
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0040-5833
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00159223

✦ Synopsis

The article provides an evolutionary analysis of a finite!y iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The backward induction reasoning for a breakdown of cooperation in this game is transformed to an evolutionary degradation effect. After the introduction of random variations in the strategies' population size, however, cyclical variations of cooperativeness may appear. A breakdown of cooperation is no longer inevitable. An analysis for all possible payoff relations in Prisoner's Dilemma matrices shows that only four qualitatively different dynamical flows can emerge.