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Further analysis of the Internet key exchange protocol

✍ Scribed by J Zhou

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2000
Tongue
English
Weight
114 KB
Volume
23
Category
Article
ISSN
0140-3664

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✦ Synopsis

Secure communication over the Internet becomes an essential requirement for any value-added Internet application. The use of cryptography for secure communication brings out the requirement of cryptographic key management. This paper examines some security issues on the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol specified in RFC 2409. The investigation is intended for clarifying some specification ambiguities in RFC 2409 and facilitating a correct implementation of the IKE protocol.

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