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Excess entry in an experimental winner-take-all market

✍ Scribed by Urs Fischbacher; Christian Thöni

Book ID: 116635291
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2008
Tongue: English
Weight: 275 KB
Volume: 67
Category: Article
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018

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