## Abstract In labor markets where few companies compete for many workers, economic theory predicts monopsony rents. Surprisingly, soccer clubs do not profit from the expected rents. The purpose of this study is to explain such contradictory evidence. Our model and empirical test, using data obtai
✦ LIBER ✦
Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets
✍ Scribed by Karl Wärneryd
- Book ID
- 117609936
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2002
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 173 KB
- Volume
- 41
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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