✦ LIBER ✦

Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market

✍ Scribed by Mark J. Browne

Book ID: 124613668
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 1992
Tongue: English
Weight: 426 KB
Volume: 59
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-4367
DOI: 10.2307/253214

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