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Adverse selection in the health insurance market: some empirical evidence

✍ Scribed by Marcelo Resende; Rodrigo Zeidan

Publisher
Springer
Year
2010
Tongue
French
Weight
188 KB
Volume
11
Category
Article
ISSN
1618-7598

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