๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

โœ Scribed by Maskin, Eric; Riley, John


Book ID
108533909
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2000
Tongue
English
Weight
115 KB
Volume
67
Category
Article
ISSN
0034-6527

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.


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On the equivalence between descending bi
โœ Edi Karni ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1988 ๐Ÿ› Springer US ๐ŸŒ English โš– 308 KB

Bidding the same price in descending bid auctions and in first price sealed bid auctions is equivalent to expected utility maximizing behavior, and this is equivalent to dynamically consistent bidding. The claim that, in strategic form, descending bid and first price sealed bid auctions are the same