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Distribution-neutral provision of public goods

✍ Scribed by Udo Ebert; Georg Tillmann

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2006
Tongue: English
Weight: 219 KB
Volume: 29
Category: Article
ISSN: 0176-1714
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0189-9

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