Current eorts at administrative reform in both developed and developing countries have invariably focused on the critical issue of provision of public goods and services. The accumulated experience and attendant innovations are therefore vast. Few attempts have been made to pull this experience toge
Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly “Lumpy” public goods
✍ Scribed by Ryo Kawasaki; Shigeo Muto
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 841 KB
- Volume
- 58
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0165-4896
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
We examine farsighted stable sets in a public good provision game where the public good is perfectly ''lumpy'' as defined by Taylor [Taylor, M., 1987. The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge]. In this case, Taylor argues that the game is not a prisoners' dilemma game. While Suzuki and Muto [Suzuki, A., Muto, S., 2005. Farsighted stability in an n-Person Prisoner's dilemma. International Journal of Game Theory 33, 431-445] have shown that almost all outcomes included in a farsighted stable set of a prisoners' dilemma game are Pareto efficient, we show in our game that almost all strictly individually rational outcomes are included in a farsighted stable set, including those that are not Pareto efficient.
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