We investigate a linear state differential game of advertising, under Cournot and Bertrand competition. A unique saddlepoint equilibrium exists if the marginal cost of advertising is sufficiently low. Bertrand competition entails more intense advertising than Cournot competition, since increasing ma
β¦ LIBER β¦
Differential game models of advertising competition
β Scribed by Gary M. Erickson
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1995
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 665 KB
- Volume
- 83
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0377-2217
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