Design of a Multi–Unit Double Auction E–Market
✍ Scribed by Pu Huang; Alan Scheller–Wolf; Katia Sycara
- Book ID
- 108528290
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2002
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 224 KB
- Volume
- 18
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0824-7935
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
We present a double-auction artificial financial market populated by heterogeneous agents who trade one risky asset in exchange for cash. Agents issue random orders subject to budget constraints. The limit prices of orders may depend on past market volatility. Limit orders are stored in the book whe
We study the learning behavior of a population of buyers and a population of sellers whose members are repeatedly randomly matched to engage in a sealed bid double auction. The agents are assumed to be boundedly rational and choose their strategies by imitating successful behavior and adding innovat