Delegation in contests
โ Scribed by Kyung Hwan Baik; In-Gyu Kim
- Book ID
- 114179358
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1997
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 924 KB
- Volume
- 13
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-2680
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
## Abstract Owners usually want their managers to maximize profits. As the literature on strategic delegation has shown it may be beneficial to owners to put a positive weight on sales in the optimal linear incentive scheme for managers to make them behave more aggressively in the market. This pape
## Abstract Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If