Delegation and Information Sharing in Cournot Duopoly
β Scribed by Bernd Theilen
- Book ID
- 106217744
- Publisher
- Springer Vienna
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 621 KB
- Volume
- 92
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1617-7134
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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