In a recent paper, Lehrer and Paxson suggest the following analysis of non-basic knowledge: S has non-basic knowledge that h if and only if (i) h is true, (ii) S believes that h, and (iii) there is some statement p that completely justifies S in believing that h and no other statement defeats this j
โฆ LIBER โฆ
Defeasibility
โ Scribed by W. Haas
- Book ID
- 124838954
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Year
- 1957
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 213 KB
- Volume
- 66
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0026-4423
- DOI
- 10.2307/2251062
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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