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Credibility in stackelberg games

โœ Scribed by Peter B. Luh; Ying-Ping Zheng; Yu-Chi Ho

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1984
Tongue
English
Weight
279 KB
Volume
5
Category
Article
ISSN
0167-6911

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis

In a Stackelberg game, the leader can form incentives and raise threats upon followers to improve his own performance. The issue of credibility concerns whether the followers believe or not in the incentives and threats declared by the leader. In this paper, credibility is studied for two-person, single-stage games. A strategy is said to be fully credible if it satisfies the Principles of Optimality under the Stackelberg setting. The conditions for the existence of a fully credible Stackelberg strategy are explicitly stated and proved. It is shown that these conditions are fairly stringent, and are satisfied only by a very restricted class of games. When a fully credible strategy does not exist, several possible solutions are then discussed.

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