Dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with non-unique solutions
β Scribed by Pu-yan Nie; Ming-yong Lai; Shu-jin Zhu
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 276 KB
- Volume
- 69
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0362-546X
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This paper derives and illustrates a new suboptimal-consistent feedback solution for an inΓΏnitehorizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game. This solution lies in the same solution space as the inΓΏnite-horizon, dynamic-programming, feedback solution but puts the leader in a preferred equilib
In many dynamic Stackelberg games, the leader changes at each stage. A new type of dynamic Stackelberg game is initially put forward in this paper and is called dynamic Stackelberg games with the leaders in turn, in which players act as the leaders in turn. There exist extremely comprehensive applic