## Abstract Cooperative game theory solution concepts are used to allocate costs in a spanning tree network. Stable cost allocations are related to the core of a cooperative game and it is proved that every game generated from a minimum cost spanning tree with an immovable source has a core. A refi
Cost allocation for a spanning tree
β Scribed by A. Claus; D. J. Kleitman
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 1973
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 770 KB
- Volume
- 3
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0028-3045
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Abstract
The problem of allocating cost in a spanning tree network is considered. A number of possible schemes are surveyed, and critically analyzed. Methods are suggested that are preferred given different emphases among the criteria for such a function.
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## Abstract A set of points, called consumers, and another point called central supplier, are located in a Euclidean plane. The cost of constructing a connection between two points is proportional to the distance between them. The minimum cost required for connecting all the consumers to the suppli
## Abstract We extend the noncooperative game associated with the cost spanning tree problem introduced by BergantiΓ±os and Lorenzo (Math Method Oper Res 59(2004), 393β403) to situations where agents have budget restrictions. We study the Nash equilibria, subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and strong
Ε½ O O Ε½log log n. . 2. In contrast, we show that, unless NP : DTIME n , there can be no polynomial time approximation algorithm for the problem that produces a solution with upgrading cost at most β£ln n times the optimal upgrading cost Ε½ . even if the budget can be violated by a factor f n , for any