The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be considered as isolated events. For this case, and assuming
β¦ LIBER β¦
Cooperation in a three-person Prisoner's Dilemma.
β Scribed by Marwell, Gerald; Schmitt, David R.
- Book ID
- 120842885
- Publisher
- American Psychological Association
- Year
- 1972
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 593 KB
- Volume
- 21
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-3514
- DOI
- 10.1037/h0032319
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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