In this paper a time-discrete dynamic model for the process of disarmament is investigated. The state variables of the system are costs and security values. We assume that the costs can be controlled, and we aim at reducing the costs to zero and achieving non-negative security values after a finite
Conditions for disarmament: A game theoretical model
β Scribed by Wilfried Engelmann
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1994
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 473 KB
- Volume
- 3
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0926-2644
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