✦ LIBER ✦

Complicated equilibria for game problems

✍ Scribed by E. R. Smol’yakov

Book ID: 110158561
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2009
Tongue: English
Weight: 354 KB
Volume: 45
Category: Article
ISSN: 0012-2661
DOI: 10.1134/s0012266109050164

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Pareto equilibria for bimatrix games

✍ P.E.M. Borm; M.J.M. Jansen; J.A.M. Potters; S.H. Tijs 📂 Article 📅 1993 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 415 KB

In this paper, it is shown that the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria for & bimatrix game resembles the structure of the set of (perfect) Nash equilibria. Msxim~ Pareto sulmets are introduced to take over the role of maximal Nash subsets. It is found that the set of Pareto equlh'brh is the f