Complexity of core allocation for the bin packing game
β Scribed by Zhixin Liu
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 853 KB
- Volume
- 37
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0167-6377
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
This paper provides complexity results and develops optimal algorithms for core membership and emptiness tests of the bin packing game. Our algorithms find the maximum surplus profit, the least integer core value, and the minimum value required by the grand coalition for the existence of an integer core allocation.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have either finite sets of players or continuum sets of players and finite coalitions. Our research is based on Peleg's axiomatization for finite games and on the notions of measurement-consistent partitions a