An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games

✍ Scribed by Eyal Winter; Myrna Holtz Wooders

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 1994
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 674 KB
• Volume: 11
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0176-1714
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00179212

✦ Synopsis

We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have either finite sets of players or continuum sets of players and finite coalitions. Our research is based on Peleg's axiomatization for finite games and on the notions of measurement-consistent partitions and the fcore introduced by Kaneko and Wooders. Since coalitions are finite in both finite games and in continuum games, we can use the reduced game property and the converse reduced game property for our axiomatization. Both properties are particularly appealing in large economies. * This paper is a revision of University of Bonn Sonderforschungsbereich 303 Discussion Paper No. B-149, with the same title. 1 Cores of games with coalition structures are studied in Aumann and Dreze (1974) and Kaneko and Wooders (1982), for example, and, with a continuum of players and finite coalitions, in Kaneko and Wooders (1986a, b; 1990).