Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
β Scribed by Jacob K. Goeree; Theo Offerman
- Book ID
- 108557475
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2003
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 130 KB
- Volume
- 113
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0013-0133
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
## Abstract Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a simple method for estimating asymm
I attempt to decide, using the posterior odds ratio, whether the symmetric common-value paradigm or the symmetric independent-private-values paradigm is a more probable explanation of the low-price, sealed-bid auctions conducted by the Indian Oil Corporation to purchase crude-oil from the internatio