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Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information

✍ Scribed by Philip J. Reny

Book ID: 112257320
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1993
Tongue: English
Weight: 812 KB
Volume: 59
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1993.1017

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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