We investigate an axiomatization of the notion of common belief (knowledge) that makes use of no rules of inference (apart from Modus Ponens and Necessitation) and highlight the property of the set of accessibility relations that characterizes each axiom.
Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief
β Scribed by Giacomo Bonanno; Klaus Nehring
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2000
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 177 KB
- Volume
- 46
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0044-3050
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
The logic of common belief does not always reflect that of individual beliefs. In particular, even when the individual belief operators satisfy the KD45 logic, the common belief operator may fail to satisfy axiom 5. That is, it can happen that neither is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly believed. We identify the intersubjective restrictions on individual beliefs that are incorporated in axiom 5 for common belief.
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