Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
β Scribed by Miguel Costa-Gomes; Vincent P. Crawford; Bruno Broseta
- Book ID
- 108556060
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 269 KB
- Volume
- 69
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0012-9682
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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