Bergmann’s dilemma: exit strategies for internalists
✍ Scribed by Jason Rogers; Jonathan Matheson
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 258 KB
- Volume
- 152
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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