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Bargaining with set-valued disagreement

✍ Scribed by Kaushik Basu

Publisher
Springer
Year
1996
Tongue
English
Weight
780 KB
Volume
13
Category
Article
ISSN
0176-1714

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

It is arguable that in many-two person bargaining situations disagreement leads to a set of possible payoffs with no probabilities attached to the elements of the set. Axioms are developed for bargaining games of this kind and solution concepts are derived from these axioms. Particular attention is paid to what are here called the "max-max" and "rectangular general" solutions. The latter can be applied to an important sub-class of bargaining games where the disagreement set is equal to the feasible set.

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