This paper provides an axiomatization of the egalitarian bargaining solution. The central axiom used (together with some standard properties of bargaining solutions) in this characterization is a transfer responsiveness condition. First, it ensures that no transfer paradox can occur if bargaining po
β¦ LIBER β¦
Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution
β Scribed by Shiran Rachmilevitch
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 2010
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 328 KB
- Volume
- 40
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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