✦ LIBER ✦

Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules

✍ Scribed by Özgür Kıbrıs; İpek Gürsel Tapkı

Book ID: 116506165
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2010
Tongue: English
Weight: 235 KB
Volume: 68
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.002

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreemen

Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules

✍ Özgür Kıbrıs; İpek Gürsel Tapkı 📂 Article 📅 2011 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 816 KB

Cooperative bargaining: Independence and

Cooperative bargaining: Independence and monotonicity imply disagreement

✍ Shiran Rachmilevitch 📂 Article 📅 2013 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 196 KB

Monotonicity of bargaining solutions wit

Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point

✍ William Thomson 📂 Article 📅 1987 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 462 KB

Bargaining with stochastic disagreement

Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs

✍ Taiji Furusawa; Quan Wen 📂 Article 📅 2003 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 194 KB

Bargaining with set-valued disagreement

✍ Kaushik Basu 📂 Article 📅 1996 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 780 KB

It is arguable that in many-two person bargaining situations disagreement leads to a set of possible payoffs with no probabilities attached to the elements of the set. Axioms are developed for bargaining games of this kind and solution concepts are derived from these axioms. Particular attention is

Disagreement point monotonicity, transfe

Disagreement point monotonicity, transfer responsiveness, and the egalitarian bargaining solution

✍ Walter Bossert 📂 Article 📅 1994 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 697 KB

This paper provides an axiomatization of the egalitarian bargaining solution. The central axiom used (together with some standard properties of bargaining solutions) in this characterization is a transfer responsiveness condition. First, it ensures that no transfer paradox can occur if bargaining po