๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

Bargaining sets in exchange economies with indivisibilities and money

โœ Scribed by M. A. Meertens; J. A. M. Potters; J. H. Reijnierse


Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Year
2005
Tongue
English
Weight
297 KB
Volume
33
Category
Article
ISSN
0020-7276

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.


๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


Bayesian implementation in exchange econ
โœ Lu Hong ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1996 ๐Ÿ› Springer ๐ŸŒ English โš– 712 KB

This paper considers the problem of implementation for exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets. Agents are assumed to have private information about their endowments. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice rules that are Bayesian implementable by feasible mech

Identical preferences lower bound soluti
โœ Carmen Bevia ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1996 ๐Ÿ› Springer ๐ŸŒ English โš– 775 KB

We consider the problem of allocating a finite set of indivisible goods and a single infinitely divisible good among a group of agents, and we study a solution, called the Identical Preferences Lower Bound solution, in the presence of consistency properties. This solution is not consistent. We prove