Bargaining sets in exchange economies with indivisibilities and money
โ Scribed by M. A. Meertens; J. A. M. Potters; J. H. Reijnierse
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 2005
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 297 KB
- Volume
- 33
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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