Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
✍ Scribed by Carmen Bevia
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1996
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 775 KB
- Volume
- 13
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
We consider the problem of allocating a finite set of indivisible goods and a single infinitely divisible good among a group of agents, and we study a solution, called the Identical Preferences Lower Bound solution, in the presence of consistency properties. This solution is not consistent. We prove that its maximal consistent subsolution is the No-envy solution. Our main result is that the minimal consistent extension of the intersection of the Identical Preferences Lower Bound solution with the Pareto solution is the Pareto solution. This result remains true in the restricted domain when all the indivisible goods are identical, but not when there is a unique indivisible good.