Bargaining: Current Research and Future Directions

✍ Scribed by Emin Karagözoğlu (editor), Kyle B. Hyndman (editor)

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2022
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 486
• Edition: 1st ed. 2022
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

This Edited Collection provides a rigorous and rich overview of current bargaining research in economics and related disciplines, as well as a discussion of future directions. The Editors create cross-disciplinary and cross-methodological synergies by bringing together bargaining researchers from various fields, including game theory, experimental economics, political economy, autonomous negotiations, artificial intelligence, environmental economics and behavioral operations management; as well as using various methods, including the strategic approach, axiomatic approach, empirical research, lab and field experiments, machine learning and decision support systems.

Offering insights into the theoretical foundations of bargaining research, traditional applications to bargaining research and topics of growing importance due to new advances in technology and the changing political and physical landscape of the world, this book is a key tool for anyone working on or interested in bargaining.

✦ Table of Contents

Acknowledgements
Contents
Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
References
Part I Theoretical and Behavioral Foundations
2 Commitment Tactics in Bargaining Under Complete Information
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Theoretical Literature
2.2.1 Stochastic Success and Inefficiency
2.2.2 Models with Deterministic Success
2.2.2.1 Applied Models of Delegation
2.2.2.2 Pre-commitment
2.3 Relevance and Future
2.3.1 Experiments
2.3.2 Field Evidence
2.3.3 Steps Forward
References
3 Reputational Bargaining
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Abreu-Gul (AG) Reputational Bargaining Model
3.2.1 The Concession Game with a Single Commitment Type
3.2.2 The Concession Game with Multiple Commitment Types
3.2.3 Convergence of Discrete-Time Bargaining to the Concession Game
3.3 Extensions
3.3.1 Endogenous Commitment Demands
3.3.2 Nonstationary Types and Payoffs-as-You-Go
3.3.3 Nonequilibrium Analysis
3.3.4 Nonstationary Environments
3.3.5 Incomplete Information About Preferences
3.4 Applications
3.4.1 Outside Options and Search Markets
3.4.2 Mediation
3.5 Experimental Evidence
3.6 Open Questions
3.6.1 Foundations for Commitment Behavior
3.6.2 Other Directions
References
4 Dynamic Bargaining with Private Information
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Dynamic Bargaining with (Endogenously) Interdependent Values
4.2.1 Revisiting the “Classic” Coase Conjecture
4.2.2 Exogenously Interdependent Values
4.2.3 Endogenously Interdependent Values: Bargaining with Arrivals
4.2.4 Endogenously Interdependent Values: Bargaining with Deadlines
4.3 Privacy in Bargaining and Endogenous Entry
4.3.1 Bargaining in the Presence of Outsiders
4.3.2 Effect of Privacy of Offers with a Sequence of Traders
4.4 Avenues for Future Research
References
5 Reference Dependence in Bargaining Models
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Reference Dependence in Cooperative Bargaining Models
5.3 Reference Dependence in Non-cooperative Bargaining Models
5.4 Discussion
References
6 Focal Points in Experimental Bargaining Games
6.1 Focal Points in Bargaining
6.2 Bargaining with Payoff-Based Focal Points
6.2.1 Equality as Focal Point
6.2.2 Efficiency as Focal Point
6.3 Bargaining with Label-Based Focal Points
6.3.1 Player Labels as Focal Points
6.3.2 Strategy Labels as Focal Points
6.3.2.1 Tacit Bargaining Games Framed as Matching Games
6.3.2.2 The Bargaining Table Design
6.3.2.3 Other Applications of the Bargaining Table Design
6.4 Discussion and Conclusion
References
7 Between Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism: Some Ethical Aspects of the Nash Bargaining Solution
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Preliminaries
7.2.1 Axioms
7.3 Shapley’s Result
7.4 Bounds
7.5 Suppes-Sen Dominance and Mariotti’s Result
7.6 Midpoint Domination
7.7 Indivisible Goods
7.8 ”Utility Production” and the Nash Product
7.9 A Probabilistic View on Bargaining
7.10 Conclusion
References
8 Dynamic Legislative Bargaining
8.1 Introduction
8.2 General Framework
8.3 Existence of Equilibria
8.4 Distributive Policy
8.5 Spatial Policy
8.6 Efficiency
8.7 Open Questions
References
Part II Applications
9 Legislative Bargaining Experiments
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Methodology of Laboratory Experiments
9.3 Ad hoc Committees
9.3.1 Overview of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) Model
9.3.2 Bargaining Protocol
9.3.3 Voting Rules and Continuation Values
9.3.4 Voting Power
9.3.5 Communication 
9.3.6 Bargaining with Public Goods and Public Policy
9.3.7 Bargaining over Endogenous Budgets
9.3.8 Effect of Malapportionment
9.4 Standing Committees
9.4.1 Dynamic Bargaining with Endogenous Status quo 
9.4.2 The Effects of Communication 
9.4.3 Veto Power 
9.4.4 Public Good Accumulation
9.4.5 Agenda Setting Rules
9.5 Future Directions
References
10 Market Institutions, Prices and Distribution of Surplus: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Theory and Experiment
10.2.1 Theoretical Predictions
10.2.2 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
10.2.3 Experimental Procedures
10.3 Results
10.3.1 Observed Bargaining Behaviour
10.3.2 Observed Auction Behaviour
10.4 Discussion
References
11 Empirical Models of Bargaining with Externalities in IO and Trade
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Bargaining Equilibrium
11.3 Estimation
11.4 Empirical Applications
11.4.1 Media Content and Distribution
11.4.2 Health Care
11.4.3 Groceries
11.4.4 Other Sectors
11.4.5 Tariff Determination in International Trade
11.5 Conclusion and New Directions
References
12 Bargaining in Healthcare Markets: Applications of Nash-in-Nash and Extensions
12.1 Bargaining in Healthcare, Upstream, and Downstream
12.1.1 Applications to Buyer Power: Purchasing of Medical Devices, Pharmaceuticals, and Hospital Care
12.1.2 Applications to Supplier Market Power: Mergers and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining
12.2 Modeling Network Formation
12.2.1 Strategic Exclusion
12.2.1.1 Selection on networks
12.2.1.2 Quality regulation
12.2.2 Frictions in network formation
12.3 New Directions: Contracts, Organizations, and Information
12.3.1 Enhancing the Contracting Space
12.3.2 Asymmetric Information Bargaining
12.4 Discussion: Progress and Opportunities for Bargaining in Healthcare and Beyond
References
13 Bargaining and Climate Change Negotiations
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Modeling the Kyoto world
13.2.1 The Basic Model
13.2.2 Variations on a Theme
13.2.2.1 The Role of a Leader
13.2.2.2 Features of International Negotiations
13.2.2.3 Future Binding Negotiations
13.2.2.4 Asymmetry of Information
13.3 The Paris Agreement Arrives, New Models Are Needed
13.4 Conclusion
References
14 Bargaining and War
14.1 Crisis Bargaining
14.2 The Basic Framework and Fearon’s Rationalist Accounts of War
14.3 Informational Problems
14.3.1 Dynamic Bargaining
14.3.2 Bargaining Power
14.3.3 Robust Predictions: Mechanism Design Approach
14.3.4 Resolution of Informational Problems
14.4 Commitment Problems
14.4.1 Lack of Commitment to Future Redistribution
14.4.2 Shift of Power and Persistent Fighting
14.4.3 Robust Predictions: A Unifying Approach
14.4.4 Resolution of Commitment Problems
14.5 Discussion and Future Directions
References
15 Bargaining in Operations Management Research
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Features of Bargaining Research in OM
15.3 Ultimatum Offers
15.3.1 Full Information
15.3.2 Asymmetric information
15.4 Unstructured Bargaining
15.4.1 Full Information
15.4.2 Asymmetric information
15.5 Established Results and Future Directions
15.5.1 Established Results
15.5.2 Future Directions
References
Part III Advances in Bargaining Research: New Platforms, Challenges and Techniques
16 Field Experiments in Bargaining
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Discrimination in the Marketplace
16.3 Bargaining Within the Household
16.4 Gender and Bargaining
16.5 Role of Culture and Ethnicity
16.6 Efficiency and Welfare
16.7 Discussion and Possible Directions for Future Research
References
17 Bargaining in Online Markets
17.1 eBay’s Best Offer Platform
17.2 Cheap-Talk Signaling and Bargaining
17.3 Protocol Design: Communication and Bargaining Breakdown
17.4 New Tools and Directions
References
18 Self-sufficient, Self-directed, and Interdependent Negotiation Systems: A Roadmap Toward Autonomous Negotiation Agents
18.1 Introduction
18.2 The Autonomy Diagonal of Negotiation
18.2.1 Negotiation Support Systems
18.2.2 Game Theoretical Approaches and Trading Bots
18.2.3 Negotiation Analytical Approaches
18.3 Major Challenges
18.3.1 Domain Knowledge and Preference Elicitation
18.3.1.1 Preference Elicitation on-the-Fly
18.3.1.2 Domain Modeling
18.3.2 Long-Term Perspective
18.3.2.1 Repeated Encounters
18.3.2.2 Non-Stationary Preferences
18.3.3 User Trust and Adoption
18.3.3.1 User Participation
18.3.3.2 Transparent Consequences
18.4 Concluding Observations
References
19 Using Machine Learning to Understand Bargaining Experiments
19.1 Introduction
19.1.1 A brief history of bargaining experiments
19.1.2 Returning to a Less Popular Route
19.2 Theory and Experiments
19.2.1 Theoretical Framework
19.2.2 Experiments
19.2.2.1 Design
19.2.2.2 Experiment 1
19.2.2.3 Experiment 2
19.3 Experimental Results
19.3.1 Basics
19.3.2 Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning
19.4 Open Questions, Challenges, and Future Directions
Appendix
References
20 Emotions in Bargaining
20.1 The intrapersonal effects of emotions in bargaining
20.1.1 Relevant theories
20.1.2 Empirical work
20.2 The interpersonal effects of emotions in bargaining
20.2.1 Relevant theory
20.2.2 Empirical work
20.3 Emotion and deception in negotiation
20.3.1 Relevant theory
20.3.2 Empirical work
20.4 Conclusions and future directions
References
21 Gender Differences in Negotiation and Policy for Equalizing Outcomes
21.1 Introduction
21.2 “Fixing the women”
21.2.1 Lean-In Recommendation
21.2.2 Improving Negotiation Skills
21.3 Fixing Institutions
21.3.1 Banning Salary Negotiations
21.3.2 Salary History Ban
21.3.3 Transparency
21.4 Conclusion
References
Index