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An Agent-based Model of Social Norm and Cooperationp

✍ Scribed by Yu, Tongkui; Zhang, Li

Book ID: 122811140
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2013
Tongue: English
Weight: 258 KB
Volume: 17
Category: Article
ISSN: 1877-0509
DOI: 10.1016/j.procs.2013.05.121

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