Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
β Scribed by Philippe De Donder; Jean Hindriks
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 429 KB
- Volume
- 38
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0895-5646
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
## SUMMARY We use invoices for hospital services from a regional hospital in Croatia to test for adverse selection and moral hazard. There are three categories of patients: with no supplemental insurance, who bought it, and who are entitled to it for free. Our identification procedure relies on the
## Abstract We extend the __strategic contract model__ where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs __within__ each ownerβmanager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation inv