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Adverse selection and equilibrium in liability insurance markets

✍ Scribed by Lawrence A. Berger; J. David Cummins

Publisher: Springer
Year: 1992
Tongue: English
Weight: 951 KB
Volume: 5
Category: Article
ISSN: 0895-5646
DOI: 10.1007/bf00057883

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