Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
β Scribed by Marilda Sotomayor
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 294 KB
- Volume
- 38
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
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