β Scribed by Katie Atkinson; Trevor Bench-Capon
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
Lay persons, and all but a few philosophers, believe that we can hold most people morally responsible for at least some of their actions and inactions. (Hereafter, I shall simply speak of"actions," but it should be understood that I mean "actions or inactions.") Furthermore, lay persons at least, an
This panel aims to inform participants of, and to stimulate interest in, the diverse ways in which the measurement of information (informetrics) is used in real-world applications. Its timeliness is indicated by the recent increase in interest amongst ASIS&T members in informetrics that culminated i