Problems in developing a practical theory of moral responsibility

✍ Scribed by Susan Leigh Anderson

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 1996
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 660 KB
• Volume: 30
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0022-5363
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00164550

✦ Synopsis

Lay persons, and all but a few philosophers, believe that we can hold most people morally responsible for at least some of their actions and inactions. (Hereafter, I shall simply speak of"actions," but it should be understood that I mean "actions or inactions.") Furthermore, lay persons at least, and probably a good number of philosophers as well, believe that although borderline cases exist, there are times when we can feel reasonably confident in maintaining that either oneself or another should, or should not, be held morally responsible for particular actions. I will not question these assumptions. Instead, I will use them as a starting point for a discussion of the concept of moral responsibility. I believe that in practice very few people behave in ways which show that they seriously question them. Walter T. Stace once said of the belief in free will, after establishing that it is necessary for moral responsibility, that: