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Act utilitarianism and the moral fanaticism argument

โœ Scribed by Mark Timmons


Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Year
1984
Tongue
English
Weight
605 KB
Volume
46
Category
Article
ISSN
0031-8116

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โœฆ Synopsis


Act utilitarianism generally and various act utilitarian (AU) principles, have received a good deal of attention from philosophers -most of it negative and destructive in character. Indeed, it is hard to find a contemporary philosopher who would admit to being an act utilitarian; the problems are numerous, serious and well-known. One apparently devastating criticism of a whole range of AU principles is Marcus Singer's claim that such principles are open to the charge of moral fanaticism; i.e., they commit one to the view that "no action is indifferent or trivial, that every occasion is momentous. ''1 Singer uses this moral fanaticism argument (MFA) against so-called positive AU principles, while defending a negative principle, the principle of consequences, (C). 2 Indeed, in his Generalization in Ethics (GE), the MFA seems to be one of Singer's strongest weapons for eliminating C's AU rivals and thereby supporting C.

Singer is not the only philosopher to invoke this fanaticism charge; many philosophers, including myself, have leaned heavily on arguments like the MFA in attacking AU theories. For example, it has shown up recently in the work of Richard Brandt who writes: "there is much to be said [in favor of Singler's claim] that act utilitarianism leads to moral fanaticism. ''a To my knowledge, this argument has never been seriously examined, though upon examination, I find there is less to be said for it than has been supposed. In what follows, I shall examine the MFA in detail and argue that it is not as devastating as many have thought, as I have thought; indeed, the act utilitarian can altogether escape the charge of being a fanatic. Moreover, my criticism of this argument reveals an interesting and philosophically important point: philosophers have, on occasion, "built in to" an AU principle some unacceptable theory of value and thus the principle itself has been an unfortunate victim of guilt by association.

In supporting these contentions, I have divided my paper into two sections plus a conclusion. In Section I, I spell out what is involved in the MFA. My


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